In a combinatorial auction, multiple items are for sale simultaneously to a set of buyers. These buyers are allowed to place bids on subsets of the available items. A special kind of combinatorial auction is the so-called matrix bid auction, which was developed by Day (2004). The matrix bid auction imposes restrictions on what a bidder can bid for a subsets of the items. This paper focusses on ...

HARISH G KAMMANAHALLI. Effects of Approximation on an Iterative Combinatorial Auction. (Under the direction of Dr Ṗeter Wurman.) Combinatorial auctions are a promising way of solving the complicated heterogeneous resource allocation problem. However combinatorial auctions present inherently hard computational problems for agents and auctioneers. In particular (1) the auction must solve the winn...

We investigate the problem of winner determination from computational social choice theory in the data stream model. Specifically, we consider the task of summarizing an arbitrarily ordered stream of n votes on m candidates into a small space data structure so as to be able to obtain the winner determined by popular voting rules. As we show, finding the exact winner requires storing essentially...

We characterize the class of committee scoring rules that satisfy the fixed-majority criterion. In some sense, the committee scoring rules in this class are multiwinner analogues of the single-winner Plurality rule, which is uniquely characterized as the only single-winner scoring rule that satisfies the simple majority criterion. We find that, for most of the rules in our new class, the comple...

Abstract Combinatorial auctions address the sale of materials where there exist complementarities between items. A major stumbling block to the widespread use of combinatorial auctions is the complexity of winner determination known to be NP-complete. We consider a rich version of combinatorial auctions, rule-based combinatorial auctions, where bids consist of rules that describe acceptable bun...

Given an optimal solution to the winner determination problem of a combinatorial auction, standard approaches provide exact incentive compatibility. Even here, significant economic concerns typically preclude these approaches. For large combinatorial auction problems, however, winner determination can only be solved approximately due to its high computational complexity, and the design of appro...

The problem of optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions consists of finding the set of bids that maximize the revenue for the sellers. Various solutions exist for solving this problem but they are all centralized. That is, they assume that all bids are sent to a centralized auctioneer who then determines the winning set of bids. In this paper we introduce the problem of distribute...

In computational social choice, we are concerned with the development of methods for joint decision making. A central problem in this field is the winner determination problem, which aims at identifying the most preferred alternative(s). With the rise of modern e-business platforms, processing of huge amounts of preference data has become an issue. In this work, we apply the MapReduce framework...