This study proposes a novel option-revenue sharing coordination contract framework. In the proposed model, the retailer determines the number of order sales effort. The manufacturer sets the price of products for the wholesale strategy. The investigated supply chain problem analyzes the results of different strategies. In the proposed coordination contract problem, two types of games including ...

considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory. considering vendor as a leader and retailers as followers, stackelberg game theory is applied for modeling and analyzing this system. a general mixed integer nonlinear model is developed which can optimizes the performance of the system under revenue sharing c...

We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a procure-to-stock retailer facing a newsvendor problem with a forecast update. Under a wholesale price contract, the retailer waits as long as she can and optimally places her order after observing the forecast update. We show that the retailer’s wait-and-decide strategy, induced by the wholesale price contract, hinders the manufactur...

We consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenue-sharing contract. We confirm that the rev...

We consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with endogenous upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality-dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenuesharing contract. We confirm th...

We consider a newsvendor problem in a supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower.We examine how themanufacturer can contract awholesale-price-only agreementwith its retailer thatmaximizes its profit.We also propose a returns policy with a wholesale-price-discount scheme (returns-discount contract) that...

We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand forecast information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon. We show that the manufacturer’s optimal dynamic long-term contract takes a simple form: in the first period, based on her private demand forecast, the retailer selects a wholesale price and pays an associated upfront fee, and, from then on, the two parties...

W every firm in a supply chain bears supply risk (the cost of insufficient supply), some firms may, even with wholesale price contracts, completely avoid inventory risk (the cost of unsold inventory). With a push contract there is a single wholesale price and the retailer, by ordering his entire supply before the selling season, bears all of the supply chain’s inventory risk. A pull contract al...

We consider a manufacturer selling to a retailer with private demand information arising dynamically over an infinite time horizon. Under a backlogging model, we show that the manufacturer’s optimal dynamic long-term contract takes a simple form: in the first period, based on her private demand forecast, the retailer selects a wholesale price and pays an associated upfront fee, and, from then o...