Identifying authorship correctly and efficiently is a difficult problem when the literature is abundant, but poorly recorded. Homonyms are tedious to differentiate. This paper describes how the field of economics has organized itself with respect to author identification. We describe the RePEc project with a special emphasis on the RePEc Author Service. We then discuss how the concept is curren...

After arXiv.org, the RePEc economics library offers the second-largest source of freely downloadable scientific preprints in the world. RePEc has a different business model and a different content coverage than arXiv.org. This paper addresses both

Recent literature has shown that all-pay auctions raise more money for charity than either winner-pay auctions or lotteries. We demonstrate that first-price and second-price winnerpay auctions have a better revenue performance than first-price and second-price all-pay auctions when bidders are sufficiently asymmetric. Lotteries can also provide higher revenue than all-pay auctions. To prove thi...

We study the Diamond-Dybvig [3] model as developed in Green and Lin [5] and Peck and Shell [7]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in recordkeeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. Fo...

This paper investigates the role of banking supervision in controlling bank risk. Banking supervision is measured in terms of enforcement outputs (i.e., on-site audits and sanctions). Our results show an inverted U-shaped relationship between on-site audits and bank risk, while the relationship between sanctions and risk appears to be linear and negative. We also consider the combined effect of...