We extend some necessary and sufficient conditions for strict local Pareto minima of orderm obtained by Jiménez (2002) to the case of weak ψ-sharp local Pareto minima, i.e., to the case when the local solution is not necessarily unique.

Design of control systems is characterised by many targets, therefore the methods enabling optimisation of several objectives have received more and more attention over the past years. When dealing with multi-objective optimisation problems the notion of the scalar function optimality was extended. The most common approach was originally proposed in 19th century by Edgeworth and later generalis...

In this paper, we investigate the existence of Pareto and weak Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games without compactness. By employing an existence theorem of Pareto equilibria due to Yu and Yuan([10]), several existence theorems of Pareto and weak Pareto equilibria for the multiobjective games are established in a similar way to Flores-Bázan([4]).

We investigate the domain of comprehensive but not necessarily convex bargaining problems. Without convexity the Nash solution is not well de ̄ned. We propose a new solution, the Nash Extension, that coincides with the Nash solution when S is convex. We characterize it by Weak Pareto Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, Continuity, and a new axiom, Ethical Monotonicity. Journal of Economic Li...

The present study addresses the following question: if among a group of decision making units, the decision maker is required to increase inputs and outputs to a particular unit in which the DMU, with respect to other DMUs, maintains or improves its current efficiencylevel, how much should the inputs and outputs of the DMU increase? This question is considered as a problem of inverse data envel...

Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson (1992) introduced the Ordinal Nash Bargaining Solution. They prove that Pareto optimality, ordinal invariance, ordinal symmetry, and IIA characterize this solution. A feature of their work is that attention is restricted to a domain of social choice problems with an infinite set of basic allocations. We introduce an alternative approach to solving finite social cho...

Roth (1977) axiomatized the Nash (1950) bargaining solution without Pareto optimality, replacing it by strong individual rationality in Nash’s axiom list. In a subsequent work (Roth, 1979) he showed that when strong individual rationality is replaced by weak individual rationality, the only solutions that become admissible are the Nash and the disagreement solutions. In this paper I derive anal...

This paper deals with the problem of existence of compromise decisions and conditions for a compromise decision to be weakly Pareto-optimal, i.e., to be a weak Pareto-maximizer, Pareto-maximizer, or strong Pareto-maximizer. The concept of compromise decision is generalized by adopting triangular norms. Further, a concept of fuzzy interval is introduced. Suucient conditions for the existence of ...

A stationary variant of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma in which the game frontier is a parallelogram is analyzed. By using the probabilistic cheap talk concept of [3], the discount factor becomes fungible, and for a critical value of the discount factor a unique Pareto-optimal and Pareto-dominant solution can be found. The relative bargaining power of the players can be quantified in terms of ...