petroleum upstream service contracts possess different aspects of legal, contractual, fiscal, economic, technical and environmental nature. in this research, efforts have been made to review one of the aspects of the petroleum upstream contracts which have been far too little considered, namely the fiscal system of upstream service contracts. since every service contract possesses its own indep...

buy-back contracts in the upstream oil and gas projects of iran, has experienced the third generation of this kind of contracts since its inception on 1373 (1994) when the oil and gas industry of iran opend its petroleum market to the foreign investment. these contracts have since been subject to the various critieques raised by international oil companies, foreign investors, or petroleum exper...

the analyze of petroleum contracts demonstrate that in respect to the intensity of the cooperation between the state company and oil companies, we could find the different evaluative categories of the contracts on upstream oil industry.historically, the first generation of the petroleum contracts was the concession agreement in which the transferring of ownership was the base. the license agree...

as observed in some oil and gas countries, upstream service contracts, for instance buy-back contract in iran, would provide an appropriate environment for the development of oil and gas fields. however, certain cases, such as common structures and reservoirs, deep sea oil fields or second and third generations of an oil field may require more attractive contractual mechanisms in the eyes of io...

investment in oil and gas upstream activities is very important for the exploration and development of oil and gas fields. different and various laws and regulations deal with the investment in upstream operations. by reviewing these various laws and regulations, this research paper tries to discuss to what extent these laws and regulations have created legal confident for foreign investment up...

In an industry characterised by secret vertical contracts, we consider a benchmark case where two vertical chains exist, with two upstream manufacturers selling to two downstream retailers, and show that the equilibrium prices are independent of whether upstream or downstream ̄rms have all the bargaining power. We then analyse two alternative mergers, and show that a downstream merger (which gi...