The basic idea is to excise the bitcoin money generation formula, and otherwise apply bitcoin essentially “as is” over digital coins which are redeemable by the mint that minted them. This will preserve the bitcoin assured anonymity. The new bitcoin.BitMint solution will benefit from bitcoin’s double-spending prevention, and would otherwise enjoy all the benefits associated with money in a digi...

Security: Forging paper currency is difficult. Unfortunately, electronic currency is just data and is easily copied. Copying or double spending of electronic currency should be prevented or detected. Ideally the illegal creation, copying, and reuse of electronic cash should be unconditionally or computationally impossible. Some systems rely instead on post-fact detection and punishment of doubl...

We introduce a novel conditional e-cash protocol allowing future anonymous cashing of bank-issued e-money only upon the satisfaction of an agreed-upon public condition. Payers are able to remunerate payees for services that depend on future, yet to be determined outcomes of events. Once payment complete, any double-spending attempt by the payer will reveal its identity; no double-spending by th...

We correct the double spend race analysis given in Nakamoto’s foundational Bitcoin article and give a closed-form formula for the probability of success of a double spend attack using the Regularized Incomplete Beta Function. We give the first proof of the exponential decay on the number of confirmations and find an asymptotic formula. Larger number of confirmations are necessary compared to th...

We study the problem of preventing double spending in electronic payment schemes in a distributed fashion. This problem occurs, for instance, when the spending of electronic coins needs to be controlled by a large collection of nodes (e.g., in a peer-to-peer (P2P) system) instead of one central bank. Contrary to the commonly held belief that this is fundamentally impossible, we propose several ...

Micropayment systems are electronic payment systems that are used for very small payment and for their viability must have small transaction cost. In this paper we propose a coin-based micropayment scheme that uses a probabilistic fraud checking with distributed verification to provide an efficient solution to detect double spending by malicious customers and hence reduces the risk on the merch...

In this paper we present a fully anonymous (for payer and payee) electronic payment scheme for B2B transactions involving high amounts, without using tamper resistant devices, without pseudonyms, and preventing double spending. Schemes with detection of double spending at deposit are not well suited for high amount transactions (merchants and banks don’t want to assume potential high losses). O...

A new scheme for electronic money is described where e-cash is created for a specific recipient in any transaction. This has benefits for the efficiency of implementing measures against double spending. Details of the scheme are provided to show that anonymity and transferability are still possible with recipient specific e-cash. The scheme ensures both authentication and integrity of the elect...

We present Bitcoin Security Tables computing the probability of success p(z, q, t) of a double spend attack by an attacker controlling a share q of the hashrate after z confirmations in time t.

In Crypto '93, S. Brands presented a very eecient oo-line electronic cash scheme based on the representation problem in groups of prime order. In Crypto '95 a very eecient oo-line divisible e-cash scheme based on factoring Williams integers was presented by T. Okamoto. We demonstrate one eecient attack on Okamoto's scheme and two on Brands' scheme which allow users to misrepresent their identit...