social anarchism sometimes referred to as socialist anarchism is generally considered tobe the branch of anarchism which sees individual freedom as being dependent upon mutual aid. socialanarchist consideration generally emphasizes community and social equality. society in the modernperiod is in a critical situation of not only economy and social system, but also in the remarkableaspects of the...

In this work, we consider an interesting variant of the well studied KP model for selfish routing on parallel links, which reflects some influence from the much older Wardrop model [29]. In the new model, user traffics are still unsplittable and links are identical. Social Cost is now the expectation of the sum, over all links, of Latency Costs; each Latency Cost is modeled as a certain polynom...

In a network creation game, initially proposed by Fabrikant et. al. [FLM+03], selfish players build a network by buying links to each other. Each player pays a fixed price per link α > 0, and suffers an additional cost that is the sum of distances to all other players. We study an extension of this game where each player is only interested in its distances to a certain subset of players, called...

Social anarchism sometimes referred to as socialist anarchism is generally considered tobe the branch of anarchism which sees individual freedom as being dependent upon mutual aid. Socialanarchist consideration generally emphasizes community and social equality. Society in the modernperiod is in a critical situation of not only economy and social system, but also in the remarkableaspects of the...

We study bottleneck congestion games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck congestion games, the utility costs of the players are determined by the worst congested resources that they use. However, the resulting Nash equilibria are inefficie...

We consider the price of stability for Nash and correlated equilibria of linear congestion games. The price of stability is the optimistic price of anarchy, the ratio of the cost of the best Nash or correlated equilibrium over the social optimum. We show that for the sum social cost, which corresponds to the average cost of the players, every linear congestion game has Nash and correlated price...

We study the welfare implications of two-sided (decentralized) markets involving multiple intermediaries between buyers and sellers. For the analysis, we employ a stylized model where the intermediary sets the quantities of ad slots to purchase and sell, and the prices are a consequence of a Cournot model. The mathematics associated with the model is generic enough that it carries forward to ot...

There have been great efforts in studying the cascading behavior in social networks such as the innovation diffusion, etc. Game theoretically, in a social network where individuals choose from two strategies: A (the innovation) and B (the status quo) and get payoff from their neighbors for coordination, it has long been known that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of this game is not 1, since the Nash...

We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selfish agents. The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy—the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum. We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish resource allocation and analyze th...

Two important metrics for measuring the quality of routing paths are the maximum edge con-gestion C and maximum path length D. Here, we study bicriteria in routing games where eachplayer i selfishly selects a path that simultaneously minimizes its maximum edge congestion Ciand path length Di. We study the stability and price of anarchy of two bicriteria games:• Max games, where ...