the shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts of cooperative game theory is defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. certainly, the shapley value can be used in interesting sharing cost/reward problems in the operations research area such as connection, routing, scheduling, production and inventory situations. in this paper, we focus on the shapl...

We provide new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional Shapley value, a weighted value with the worths of the singletons as weights. This value satisfies anonymity and therefore symmetry just as the Shapley value and has characterizations which are proportional counterparts to the famous characterizations of the Shapley value in Shapley (1953b), Myerson (1980) and Young (1985a). If the ...

Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature. For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways. In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games. The concepts and axioms, related to the Shapley value, have been extended and a characterization for the ...

universities have a magnificent role in the sustainable development of their country and international scientific production of their country. purpose of this paper is expansion of using balance scorecard in universities in order to improve performance of universities in learning and educating. the balanced scorecard (bsc) is an extensively adopted performance management framework in a lot of o...

This paper characterizes the aspects of exchangeability in the Shapley value. We show that, in the Shapley value, each player’s prospects of joining a t-player game as the last member of the game is a moment sequence of the uniform distribution. We prove that, with finite exchangeability, the Shapley value is the only value in which the probability assignment is a unique mixture of independent ...

Uncertain coalitional game deals with situations in which the transferable payoffs are uncertain variables. The uncertain core has been proposed as the solution of uncertain coalitional game. This paper goes further by presenting two definitions of uncertain Shapley value: expected Shapley value and ̨-optimistic Shapley value. Meanwhile, some characterizations of the uncertain Shapley value are...

Two extensions of the Shapley value are given. First we consider a probabilistic framework in which certain consistent allocation rules such as the Shapley value are characterized. The second generalization of the Shapley value is an extension to the structure of posets by means of a recursive form. In the latter setting, the Shapley value for quasi-concave games is shown to be a core-allocation.