Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years. Representationalism can take various forms. Most representationalists have offered a form of reductive representationalism, according to which phenomenal character is itself intentional content of a certain sort.1 Such views promise to reduce the ‘hard probl...

This paper overviews the current status of debates on tracking representationalism, the view that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of tracking features of one’s environment in a certain way. We overview the main arguments for the view and the main objections and challenges it faces. We close with a discussion of alternative versions of representationalism that might overcome the shortcoming...

To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and de...

According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called ‘‘transparency thesis.’’ According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object...

Abstract In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau offers some metaphysical reasons for rejecting representationalism. This paper overviews these reasons, arguing that while his arguments against versions representationalism succeed, there are phenomenal intentionalism escape criticisms. Still, once we consider the contents perceptual experiences, such as their perspectival conte...

Abstract Representationalism is today the leading physicalist theory of phenomenal character perceptual experience. And Russellian representationalism, which identifies contents with extensions, iteration that theory. If there exist phenomenally distinct experiences as impossible, then these would prima facie serve counterexamples to In order they definitively counterexamples, it needs be no pl...