• We study how profits of a firm should be shared in the most efficient way among heterogeneously productive, risk averse workers, and an unproductive outside investor. model as team production process subject to moral hazard. In addition awarding shares, can use incentive contracts based on noisy performance signals. show that more productive agents with noisier signals are likely motivated sh...

We analyze the following questions under imperfect labour markets. How does strategic outsourcing influence wage formation, profit sharing and employee effort when firms commit to optimal profit sharing before wage formation or decide for profit sharing after wage formation? What is the relationship between outsourcing, profit sharing, and equilibrium unemployment? We find that in both scenario...

Profit Sharing and Training We analyze the impact of profit sharing on the share of workers receiving training. An effect is plausible because: 1) profit sharing is a credible commitment by firms to reward firmspecific skills acquired by formal or informal training, 2) profit sharing may reduce turnover and increase the returns to training, 3) a common payment for the whole workforce leads to p...

We investigate the effect of profit-sharing on product and process innovation. Profit-sharing is a credible commitment of the companies to let the employees participate in any efficiency gain. Resistance against technical progress becomes less plausible. Moreover, employees are stimulated to share their specific information advantage on possibilities to optimize the production process and produ...

Profit Sharing and Relative Consumption Traditionally, it has been argued that profit sharing can increase employment and welfare because it lowers marginal labour costs without reducing total cost or labour income. In this paper, we show that profit sharing can also represent a Pareto-improvement if labour supply is excessive due to relative consumption effects. Mandatory profit sharing reduce...