We investigate optimal managerial contracts in a principal-manager-employee hierarchy with a moral hazard problem at the bottom. We allow for collusion and extortion. Side contracting between manager and employee takes place before the employee has taken his action. Information is soft under collusion. If the manager's sole duty is to report information and if we focus on collusion plus extorti...

employees’ attitude towards his/her job differs across organization’s sector. the present study aimed to find out the differences in employee’s attitude in public and private sector. for this purpose, managers’ reward power and coercive power were taken as independent variables and their impact on employees’ job satisfaction (dependent variable) was examined in both sectors. sample of 130 respo...

This white paper targets power supply engineers and managers alike by providing measurable data in favor of switching to digital power supplies. A power supply designer will find novel implementation ideas to easily achieve and exceed design objectives. Based on the many benefits of digital power described in this white paper, engineering managers will be able to make an informed decision and c...

This paper empirically examines commercialization of university faculty inventions through startup firms from 1994 through 2008. Using data from the Association of University Technology Managers and the 2010 NRC doctoral rankings, our research reveals several findings. We find that university entrepreneurship is more common in bad economic times and that engineering department quality and biolo...

BACKGROUND Priority setting and resource allocation in healthcare organizations often involves the balancing of competing interests and values in the context of hierarchical and politically complex settings with multiple interacting actor relationships. Despite this, few studies have examined the influence of actor and power dynamics on priority setting practices in healthcare organizations. Th...