We specify and compute equilibria of a dynamic policy-making game between a president and a legislature under insitutional rules that emulate those of the US Constitution. Policies are assumed to lie in a two-dimensional space in which one issue dimension captures systemic differences in partisan preferences, while the other summarizes non-partisan attributes of policy. In any period, the polic...

political marketing shares many characteristics in common with marketing in the business world. in business marketing , sellers dispatch goods, services, and communications[e.g.advertising] to the market and in return, money [consumer purchases], information [consumer research], and customer loyalty are received. in political campaigns, candidates dispatch promises , favors , policy preferences...

We study whether and why voters may choose inefficient policies and institutions. We show that a majority of subjects in an experiment vote against policies that would help them overcome social dilemmas. This is due to their failure to fully anticipate the equilibrium effects of new policies. More precisely, subjects systematically underappreciate the extent to which policy changes affect other...

This paper presents a model that demonstrates how developments in information technologies can generate increased political polarization in the absence of any changes in voter preferences. In contrast to the previous literature on the topic, the model abstracts away from possible ideological bias in the news media, and studies how specialization in information by the voters can generate politic...

despite progress towards greater public engagement, questions about the optimal approach to access public preferences remain unanswered. we review two increasingly popular methods for engaging the public in healthcare priority-setting and determining their preferences; the citizens’ jury (cj) and discrete choice experiment (dce). we discuss the theoretical framework from which each method is de...

The empirical evidence on voting behavior suggests that the individuals’ choice of the vote is explained, among other things, by policy issues and the voters’ partisan preferences over the party that rules the government. The evidence also indicates that the voters’ partisan preferences are the best predictor of the choice of the vote (Republican and Democratic voters tend to vote, respectively...

Most insights of environmental economics are in line with the standard neoclassical economic model of rational behaviour, formulated in terms of maximization of utility in general, or of profits in particular. The standard theory of environmental policy is a case in point. However, the maximization hypothesis and its methodological foundation have been criticized on many grounds related to a la...

This paper provides a theory of a parliamentary government system with proportional representation elections and policy-motivated parties and voters. In a symmetric, spatial model governments are majoritarian, they and their policies are durable, and voters elect minority parliaments in every period. A continuum of (Markov) political equilibria exist with policies that represent concessions to ...