purpose: this paper addresses whether and how the sarbanes-oxley act of 2002(sox) affects shareholder wealth (firm value) by focusing on the trade-off between improved corporate governance leading to a lower cost of capital and increased managerial compliance costs of regulations. design/methodology: we use an analytical model of solving the management utility maximization function and the chan...

Purpose: This paper addresses whether and how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(SOX) affects shareholder wealth (firm value) by focusing on the trade-off between improved corporate governance leading to a lower cost of capital and increased managerial compliance costs of regulations. Design/Methodology: We use an analytical model of solving the management utility maximization function and the cha...

An extensive finance literature has suggested that independent (outside) directors monitor firm management and thereby increase firm value. Monitoring by a firm’s independent directors is, however, costly and the level of board monitoring should be endogenously determined as a function of firm characteristics. We show that a negative relationship between board monitoring and uncertainty is a di...