This essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to Parfit’s attempt in Reasons and Persons to connect his theory of personal identity to practical rationality and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit’s critics have tried to sever the link he forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invoking the Kantian thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of p...

According to ‘Ontic Structural Realism’ (OSR), physical objects—qua metaphysical entities—should be reconceptualised, or, more strongly, eliminated in favour of the relevant structures. In this paper I shall attempt to articulate the relationship between these putative objects and structures in terms of certain accounts of metaphysical dependence currently available. This will allow me to artic...

A wave of recent work in metaphysics seeks to undermine the anti-reductionist, functionalist consensus of the past few decades in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. That consensus apparently legitimated a focus on what systems do, without necessarily and always requiring attention to the details of how systems are constituted. The new metaphysical challenge contends that many states and ...

Considering the cosmology with mythological form of consciousness era as the primary base of metaphysical form and the basis of development toward an integrated cosmology, political ideas has been placed in an organic link with a metaphysical system in the ancient Persians as well as Chinese political thought. Based on considerable similarities among cosmological systems in civilizations e.g....

Properties and facts play a central role within metaphysics, yet there is no widely accepted account of what constitutes a property or a fact. Traditional conceptions of these metaphysical notions raise serious philosophical puzzles, making the existence of each seem dubious. Drawing on the minimalist theory of truth, I argue in favor of a minimalist conception of properties and facts. A minima...

in a broader context of arguing against the view that conceivability provides epistemic access to the metaphysical modalities. His goal is “to identify the sources and forms of our knowledge of metaphysical possibility and metaphysical necessity” (205). 1 The account proceeds in two stages. First, he contends that “metaphysical necessity and metaphysical possibility can be reductively explained...