despite the often false impression that the analytic philosophy as an anti-metaphysical movement has nothing to do with metaphysics, there can be found good reasons to grant the metaphysical dispositions of analytic philosophers, and thereby, to minimize the anti-metaphysical nature of analytic philosophy in its all phases. since analytic philosophy is a historical movement the main nature of w...

Contemporary metaphysicians have been drawn to a certain attractive picture of the structure of the world. This picture consists in classical mereology, the priority of parts over wholes, and the well-foundedness of metaphysical priority. In this short note, I show that this combination of theses entails superatomism, which is a significant strengthening of mereological atomism. This commitment...

In his 1918 logical atomism lectures, Russell argued that there are no molecular facts. But he posed a problem for anyone wanting to avoid facts: we need truth-makers generalizations of formulas, but such seem be both unavoidable and have an abominably character. Call this the generalized formulas. I clarify here by distinguishing two kinds formula: incompletely formulas completely next argue t...

In this talk I consider two problems for conceptual atomism. Conceptual atomism can be defended against the criticism that it seems to contend that all concepts are simply innate (even technical concepts to pre-technological humanoids) by specifying the innateness thesis as one of mechanisms of hooking up mental representations (concepts as language of thought types) to properties in the world ...

What is the constitution of the meaning of morphemes (lexical concepts)? According to most theories, such meanings have a molecular or holistic internal structure: prototypes, exemplars, semantic networks, complex schemata, scripts, and even classical definitions. Recently, however, contrary opinions have arisen in cognitive science suggesting that lexical concepts are not semantically structur...

In this note, I present a problem for a certain natural view about the structure of the world. I show that this view is committed to a particular strengthening of atomism, which I call superatomism. Superatomism has some counterintuitive consequences (e.g. it rules out whatMarkosian [] calls the ‘pointy view’ of simples). I consider some ways of avoiding this commitment, and draw some additio...