Abstract Connecting to rule-makers in order to set favorable rules (lobbying) or paying government executives to bend the current rule (bribing) are the two main strategies for influencing government. This study in an evolutionary game model explain why bribing may become widespread while other states like compliance and cooperative lobbying are Pareto superior. The theoretical model is used ...

In a spatial common agency model, two asymmetric interest groups (principals) in‡uence a unique decision-maker (agent). The decision-maker chooses a onedimensional policy on behalf of those principals and has private information about his ideology after contracting with principals. The policy is always e¢ cient and re‡ects a weighted average between the principals’ and the agent’s ideal points....

This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and shows in which way exogenously x...

Lobbyist Registration Federal Lobbying Act & Registry of Lobbyists [1] Federal Lobbying Act & Registry of Lobbyists [1] The University of Guelph is registered as an In-House Lobbyist (Organization) under the federal Lobbying Act [2] (formerly the Lobbyists Registration Act). University employees who engage in lobbying must file a communications report [3] which is then submitted to the Office o...

Lobbyist Registration Federal Lobbying Act & Registry of Lobbyists [1] Federal Lobbying Act & Registry of Lobbyists [1] The University of Guelph is registered as an In-House Lobbyist (Organization) under the federal Lobbying Act [2] (formerly the Lobbyists Registration Act). University employees who engage in lobbying must file a communications report [3] which is then submitted to the Office o...

Lobbyist Registration Federal Lobbying Act & Registry of Lobbyists [1] Federal Lobbying Act & Registry of Lobbyists [1] The University of Guelph is registered as an In-House Lobbyist (Organization) under the federal Lobbying Act [2] (formerly the Lobbyists Registration Act). University employees who engage in lobbying must file a communications report [3] which is then submitted to the Office o...

Whether and what type of the lobbying-induced trade policies can improve the domestic welfare? We show that as compared to the case of no lobbying and the case of domestic lobbying, the domestic-foreign lobbying achieves the lowest tariff and may also realize the highest welfare for the domestic country. Our results suggest that the domestic-foreign lobbying may contribute to a freer trade in t...

Using firm level data from the U.S. steel industry, we find that lobbying for import protection is habit forming. Controlling for firm performance and other factors, past lobbying increases the likelihood of current lobbying in our full sample. Expecting heterogeneity in lobbying behavior among firms, we let an EM algorithm sort our firms into groups with different propensities to lobby. A two-...

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the com...

We investigate policy reform in a model in which there are both rent seeking and lobbying activities. These two activities involve similar skills, so a reform which reduces rents will cause a shift into lobbying. Also, lobbying is subject to a free-rider problem, so the marginal return to the industry from lobbying may greatly exceed an individual firm’s return to lobbying. Thus, the shift into...