Article history: Received 14 September 2010 Available online 22 August 2013 JEL classification: D86

Article history: Received 24 November 2015 Available online 27 December 2016 JEL classification: C72 C78 C92 D03 D86

This Online Appendix to the paper titled “Progressive Learning” presents the proof of Lemma 0, an extension of our equilibrium characterization allowing for mixed strategies, an analysis of the full commitment case, and details for Example 4 showing that path dependence can arise even when shocks are ergodic. JEL Classification Codes: C73, D86

Credit default swaps (CDSs) are thought to ease borrowing by protecting lenders against default. This paper develops a model of the demand for CDS when borrowers choose the riskiness of investment and verification is imperfect. The model shows that CDSs may lead to risk-shifting, increasing the probability of default. Our model provides new insights on the role of CDS during the recent financia...

abstract this article aims to provide theoretical model for analyzing challenge of asymmetric information in the third sector of economy (which is the most important challenge, preventing the growth and development of third sector), using the theoretical foundation of contract theory and incentive theory with regard to the special characteristics of third sector derived by its special structure...

In two-sided matching markets with contracts, the existence of stable outcomes can be guaranteed only under certain restrictions on preferences; the typical restriction is that all agents’ preferences are substitutable. We show that, in markets with a continuum of each type of agent, it is only necessary that agents on one side of the market have substitutable preferences to guarantee the exist...

I compare two information structures in a common value first-price auction with two bidders: In one, each of the two bidders knows only his own signal about the value of the object, and in the other, one of the bidders learns his opponent’s signal as well. Gaining the additional information in the second information structure makes the informed bidder worse off if the value is submodular in the...

Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of workers’ wellbeing, this paper introduces status seeking preferences in the form of rank-dependent utility functions into a moral hazard framework with one firm and multiple workers, but no correlation in production. We show that workers’ concern for the rank of their wage in the firm’s wage dist...

Yearly sales of “fair trade” products exceeds $2.3 billion worldwide. Consumers who are altruistic and rational will choose these product-donation bundles when the bundle is cheaper than its elements. Assume a supplier’s investment reduces retailers’ costs (or improves quality), but this investment is non-verifiable, hence sub-optimal even with infinitely-repeated interaction. A retailer paying...

The innovative idea of introducing a third party (Ronen,2002) into the agency relationship has motivated our proposal of a co-payment scheme as a solution to financial misreporting. In the co-payment scheme, both the client firm and a third party such as FASB are asked to share the auditing fee. We will demonstrate that the participation of a third party can create an endogenous collusion cost ...