the asian financial crisis in 1997 has awakened the regulators and corporates on the importance of corporate governance. according to agency theory, a good corporate governance system is necessary for more transparent information disclosure about the corporation. accordingly, the objective of this study is evaluating the level of disclosure in banks and examine the relationship between some fea...

this study attempts to investigate the impacts of severalcorporate governance mechanisms on two alternative proxies for agencycosts, namely the ratio of total sales to total assets (asset turnover) and theratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total sales(sg&a;). agency costs, non-executive directors on the board, andinstitutional investors are dependent variables. the analysi...

investment institutions with substantial shareholdings in a firm have the resources and incentives to monitor and influence management decisions. whether the institutions actually monitor and exert pressure on managers is an empirical question.this study is designed to provide insights into the monitoring role of institutional investors by examining whether institutional ownership affects the i...

This article looks at how a negative third-party quality signal, in the form of external monitoring of firm performance by an investor group, prompts a response from both institutional investors and the firms publicly identified as poor performers. Using a sample of 93 firms placed on the Focus List of the Council of Institutional Investors from 2000 to 2005 and a comparison group of 96 firms i...

This study shows that individual investors prefer to invest in high dividend yield stocks and in dividendpaying firms whereas relatively lower-taxed institutional investors tend to prefer low dividend yield stocks and non-paying firms. Consistent with Brennan and Thakor’s [Brennan, M. J., & A. V. Thakor. (1990). Shareholder preferences and dividend policy. Journal of Finance, 45, 993–1018] adve...