background during the last three decades, the total fertility rate (tfr) in iran has fallen considerably; from 6.5 per woman in 1983 to 1.89 in 2010. this paper analyzes the extent to which economic determinants at the micro and macro levels are associated with the number of children in iranian households.   methods household data from the 2010 household expenditure and income survey (heis) is ...

The collective approach to household behaviour models the household utility function as the weighted average of the utilities of the individual members of the household. These weights, which measure the relative bargaining power of males and females within the household, are generally regarded as fixed and exogenous. The paper extends the collective approach and estimates a model where the weig...

Existing evidence suggests that girls are differentially affected by income shocks and changes in bargaining power. Most studies, however, ignore household production and confound differential opportunity costs with changes in income or bargaining power. I disentangle these determinants of gender discrimination—preferences, income and time allocation—by comparing households with varying degrees...

This paper considers the relationship between work status and decision-making power of the head of household and his spouse. I use household fixed effects models to address the possibility that spousal work status maybe correlated with unobserved factors that also affect bargaining power within the home. Consistent with the hypothesis that greater economic resources yield greater bargaining pow...

Background During the last three decades, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Iran has fallen considerably; from 6.5 per woman in 1983 to 1.89 in 2010. This paper analyzes the extent to which economic determinants at the micro and macro levels are associated with the number of children in Iranian households.   Methods Household data from the 2010 Household Expenditure and Income Survey (HEIS) is ...

Family Bargaining and Taxes: A Prolegomenon to the Analysis of Joint Taxation Does joint taxation disadvantage women? To answer that question, this paper begins by reviewing unitary and bargaining models of intrafamily allocation, and then discusses the determinants of "bargaining power" in a world without taxes. It argues that wage rates rather than earnings are determinants of bargaining powe...

We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members moves in the same direc...

Gender inequality is linked to women’s unequal bargaining power in the household. Greater equity can be achieved by expanding women’s outside options. Paid work is a likely mechanism for improving women’s household bargaining power. But the dual phenomenon of women’s segregation in export industries in developing countries and increased firm mobility result in their unequal bargaining power vis...

Recent research on household behavior suggests that, ceteris paribus, a woman’s "power" within a household influences consumption and time allocation choices. From an empirical point of view, a central stumbling block in this line of inquiry has been identification of sources of "power" that can plausibly be treated as exogenous. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC, was paid only to s...