Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the ...

Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the boundaries of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words ‘just ain’t in the head’, and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. ...

Toward the end of their chapter “Externalism and the Impossibility of Massive Error,” Lepore and Ludwig (2007a, pp. 335–42) explain—correctly, I think—that the privileged position that Davidson grants the radical interpreter in being able to determine all things semantic suggests that his externalism is synchronic and physical. They clarify: “Synchronic externalism holds that our thought conten...

Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts pr...

In this paper I identify some unexplored implications of content externalism. The implications can be traced to the role that metaphysical realism plays in some of the standard arguments for content externalism. I do not regard these implications as undermining the case for externalism. I identify them, rather, as part of an attempt at honest accounting: the revisionary nature of content extern...

In this paper I present the idea of a kind of externalism different from what is usually considered in the internalism / externalism debate. It is intersubjective in nature, since it concerns representation determined by relations between cognitive subjects. More precisely, it concerns linguistic expression types. The basic idea is that the meaning of linguistic expression types often depends o...

In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it’s implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief.

Ever since the 1970’s, philosophers of mind have engaged in a lively discussion of Externalism. Externalism is the metaphysical thesis that the contents of one’s thoughts are determined partly by empirical features of one’s environment. Externalism appears to clash with another plausible thesis—the epistemological thesis that one can have knowledge of one’s own thoughts, without evidence or emp...