In “Epistemic Relativism,” Mark Kalderon defends a view that has become increasingly popular across various academic disciplines. He wrote his article in response to Paul Boghossian’s book Fear of Knowledge, in which epistemic relativism is criticized and dismissed as incoherent. Kalderon argues that Boghossian does not accurately characterize epistemic relativism resulting in a hasty dismissal...

Online peer assessment has been advocated by numerous contemporary educators. This study interviewed forty students who had experienced an online peer assessment activity for learning. Each of these students was asked to complete a research proposal in an educational method course for peer assessment. Using the online peer assessment system, the students, who performed the roles of both authors...

Epistemic relativism rejects the idea that claims can be assessed from a universally applicable, objective standpoint. It is greatly disdained because it suggests that the real ‘basis’ for our views is something fleeting, such as ‘‘the techniques of mass persuasion’’ (Thomas Kuhn 1970) or the determination of intellectuals to achieve ‘‘solidarity’’ (Rorty 1984) or ‘‘keep the conversation going’...

I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try ...

In Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, William Abraham offers a rich, subtle defense of an epistemology of divine revelation. In this paper, I focus on a cluster of metaepistemological claims made by Abraham. Specifically, I argue that Abraham’s remarks about epistemic fit and the epistemic standards we bring to bear in making evaluations of divine revelation claims commit him to a spe...

This paper explores the question of whether there is an interesting form of specifically epistemic relativism available, a position which can lend support to claims of a broadly relativistic nature but which is not committed to relativism about truth. It is argued that the most plausible rendering of such a view turns out not to be the radical thesis that it is often represented as being. 0. On...