This paper develops a quantitative model of trade, military conflicts, and defense spending. Trade liberalization between two countries reduces probability of an armed conflict between them, causing both to cut defense spending. This in turn causes a domino effect on defense spending by other countries. As a result, both countries and the rest of the world are better off. We estimate the model ...

This paper develops a quantitative model of trade, military conflicts, and defense spending. Trade liberalization between two countries reduces probability of an armed conflict between them, causing both to cut defense spending. This in turn causes a domino effect on defense spending by other countries. As a result, both countries and the rest of the world are better off. We estimate the model ...

The causation relationship between economic growth and military expenditures in developing countries has received growing focus in recent years. One of the arguments in this field is that military spending absorbs a significant proportion of the limited financial resources in LDCs. The present study examines the causal relation in two models: defense spending with total real economic growth and...

This study examines the prospective economic effects of a reduction below the current baseline in defense outlays of $100 billion per year over 10 years. Several recent studies have attempted to estimate the supposedly adverse economic and employment effects of reductions in government spending generally, and defense outlays in particular. Such studies have tended to exaggerate the harmful effe...

Abstract How do states distribute the burdens of collective defense? This paper develops a network theory burden sharing. We focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote in variety defense, military, and security issue areas. Using computational model, we show that DCA partners’ spending depends structure their agreements. In terms, DCAs increase by committing to acti...