JEL classification: C65, D63, D71, D81 Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 91B16

Article history: Received 4 August 2011 Available online 2 March 2012 JEL classification: D71

Article history: Received 9 October 2011 Available online 3 May 2013 JEL classification: C72 D71 D82

Article history: Received 6 February 2009 Received in revised form 10 August 2009 Accepted 9 September 2009 Available online 30 September 2009 JEL classification: D71 D72 F53 H11

We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those which incentive cooperate lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, in...

We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness is a necessary condition for a form of robust approximate implementation in large economies. JEL classi cation numbers: D78, D51, D71 Envy-Freeness and Implementation in Large Economies Matthew O. Jackson Ilan Kremer

The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case belief heterogeneity, standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such separate aggregation, new condition, called belief-proof proposed alleviate occurrences spurious agreement by restricting unanimity that can considered reasonabl...

We consider binary private contributions to public good projects that succeed when the number of contributors exceeds a threshold. show for standard distributions contribution costs, valuable threshold are more likely they require contributors. Raising success reduces free-riding incentives, and this strategic effect dominates direct effect. Common intuition easier only holds cost with right ta...