To benefit from information provided by other people, people must be somewhat credulous. However, credulity entails risks. The optimal level of credulity depends on the relative costs of believing misinformation and failing to attend to accurate information. When information concerns hazards, erroneous incredulity is often more costly than erroneous credulity, given that disregarding accurate w...

The functions of cultural beliefs are often opaque to those who hold them. Accordingly, to benefit from cultural evolution's ability to solve complex adaptive problems, learners must be credulous. However, credulity entails costs, including susceptibility to exploitation, and effort wasted due to false beliefs. One determinant of the optimal level of credulity is the ratio between the costs of ...

Article history: Received 13 April 2016 Available online 28 December 2016 JEL classification: D83

We live in irrational times. Astrology and crystal healing have never been stronger. Political argument is gradually eroding, to be replaced by mudslinging and the repetition of half-baked opinion. Recently a sweet-looking old lady sitting next to me in an aircraft told me how glad she was that the experimental medication she was taking hadn’t been tested on animals. I didn’t point out that if ...

This paper studies a model of strategic communication by an informed and upwardly biased sender to one or more receivers. Applications include situations in which (i) it is costly for the sender to misrepresent information, due to legal, technological, or moral constraints, or (ii) receivers may be credulous and blindly believe the sender’s recommendation. In contrast to the predictions obtaine...