A manufacturer must choose to delegate component procurement to its tier-1 supplier, or to control component procurement by contracting with both the tier-1 supplier and the tier-2 component supplier. Both suppliers have private cost information and the manufacturer has an alternative source of supply with cost known to all parties. This paper proves that if the firms may use arbitrarily comple...

This note studies the optimal inspection policies in a supply chain in which a manufacturer purchases components from a supplier but has no direct control of component quality. The manufacturer uses an inspection policy and a damage cost sharing contract to encourage the supplier to improve the component quality. We find that all-or-none inspection policies are optimal for the manufacturer if t...

This paper analyzes the efficiency of Korean Ship Component Part Manufacturer firms using DEA model. We evaluated the CCR, BCC efficiency and RTS of 30 Korea Ship Component Part Manufacturer firms. We also suggested the Korean Ship Component Part Manufacturer firms that can be benchmarked based on analyzed information. The result showed five enterprises whose values of CCR efficiency are 1, and...

    Capacity Reservation,   Option Contract,   Supplier Selection A key issue for manufacturing firms is planning for outsourced components. In this research, we have considered a manufacturer in a Make-to-Order production environment who has to outsource a special component from a set of suppliers. One selling season is considered and the manufacturer faces uncertain demand during the selling ...

A manufacturer must choose whether to delegate component procurement to her tier-1 supplier, or control it directly. Due to information asymmetry about suppliers’ production costs and the use of simple quantity discount or price-only contracts, either delegation or control can yield substantially higher expected profit for the manufacturer. Delegation tends to outperform control when (1) the ma...

An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) produces new products and often faces a dilemma when determining the level of interchangeability in its product design. The interchangeability is considered as a degree to which the product can be disassembled without force, and thus an increasing degree of interchangeability would decrease the OEM’s production cost, but it would also lower a remanufactu...

This work investigates how bargaining power affects negotiations between manufacturers and reverse logistics providers in reverse supply chains under government intervention using a novel three-stage reverse supply chain model for two scenarios, a reverse logistics provider alliance and no reverse logistics provider alliance. Utilizing the asymmetric Nash bargaining game, this work seeks equili...