production ofdimethyl amino ethanol (dmae) and effective parameters on efficiency and purity of the chemical were studied in this article. dimethylation of ethanol amine using aqueous formaldehyde in the presence of formic acid was applied for production of dmae. results showed that four parameters such as outlet temperature of co2 gas, reflux temperature, reflux time and extraction solvent wer...

3 Examples of VCG mechanisms 5 3.1 Single-item auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2 Auctions of identical items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3 Procurement auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4 Public project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Consider the designers of a multiagent environment, who are charged with establishing the rules by which agents in an encounter will interact. Once the rules of encounter have been determined, each builder of each agent is free to design his own machine any way that he wants. However, the rules that were established will certainly affect the choices he makes in building his own agent. In this a...

In the customary VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In this paper we study the sequential VCG mechanism and show that other dominant strategies may then exist. We illustrate how this fact can be used to minimize taxes using examples concerned with Clarke tax and public projects.

We discuss the design of a hybrid mechanism for e-procurement, which implements a multi-attribute combinatorial auction, followed by a bargaining process to achieve desirable procurement transaction outcomes. For the auction phase of the mechanism, we discuss incentive-compatible bidding strategies for suppliers, and how the buyer should determine the winning suppliers. In the follow-on bargain...

As we saw in the first part of this short series, a mechanism design problem involves engineering rules game so that, if participants then behave rationally (by choosing strategies that maximize their expected utility, for example), result will satisfy some desired property. So far, however, have said nothing about what these desirable properties might be, or mechanisms achieve them. Here, dig ...

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke–Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that thesemechanisms generally av...

Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are operated through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system operator determines the accepted bids based on an optimization algorithm. We develop the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for these electricity markets. ...

Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are procured through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system operator determines the accepted bids based on an optimization algorithm. We develop the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for these electricity markets. ...

The search for viable eBusiness models continues. But important information is being overlooked. Discussions of open source software all too often focus on the limited context of Microsoft appearing to feel threatened by what it portrays as unbusinesslike competition from Linux and OpenOffice.org; whereas that debate is merely one small facet of the whole. Moreover, in addition to software, a g...