Changes in production cost always lead to changes in wholesale and retail price. How to adjust the wholesale price, retail price and order quantity in order to derive an optimal strategy for the supplier and the retailer is one of the most perplexing problems. The purpose of this study is to develop a strategy to maximize the expected profit by simultaneously determining the adjustment ratio o...

This paper studies a competition in a decentralized supply chain between two independent suppliers who sell their products to a common retailer, under sales-rebate contract, and wherein the demand is sensitive to retail prices. The inventory related operational costs are included in the chain based on the economic order quantity model. The conditions of existence and uniqueness of the retailer’...

This study considers a manufacturer with ambidextrous sustainable innovation capability selling products in environmentally conscious market through an independent retailer two-period game setting. We design theoretic and dyadic supply chain (SC) model considering exploitative exploratory nature of environmental innovations. five different contract types, namely, wholesale price contract, verti...

A major concern in the design of wholesale electricity markets is the potential for the exercise of market power by generating unit owners. To better understand the determinants of generating unit owner market power and how it is exercised, this paper derives a model of bidding behavior in a competitive electricity market which incorporates various sources of uncertainty and the impact of the e...

Asymmetric pricing is the phenomenon where prices rise more readily than they fall. We articulate, and provide empirical support for, a theory of asymmetric pricing in wholesale prices. In particular, we show how wholesale prices may be asymmetric in the small but symmetric in the large, when retailers face costs of price adjustments. Such retailers will not adjust prices for small changes in t...

In this paper, we study a buyback contract model of the competitive newsvendor problem between a single supplier and multiple retailers under simultaneous price and safety stock competition. A price completion factor and a spill rate translate the price and safety stock competition, respectively. Our model is an extension of the problem analyzed in Zhao and Atkins (2) by the adoption of a buyba...

I is common for a retailer to sell products from competing manufacturers. How then should the firms manage their contract negotiations? The supply chain coordination literature focuses either on a single manufacturer selling to a single retailer or one manufacturer selling to many (possibly competing) retailers. We find that some key conclusions from those market structures do not apply in our ...

We study the performance of a stylized supply chain where two firms, a retailer and a producer, compete in a Stackelberg game. The retailer purchases a single product from the producer and afterward sells it in the retail market at a stochastic clearance price. The retailer, however, is budget constrained and is therefore limited in the number of units that he may purchase from the producer. We...

The paper establishes a fairness preference framework based on game theory of Nash bargaining, and builds a utility system about fairness preference. On the basis, we expeands the newboy model to behavior research. The analysis shows that because of the retailer and suppliers’ fairness preference, their optimal order quantities tend to became conservative, and the result shows that the greater ...