We study coordination mechanisms for Scheduling Games (with unrelated machines). In these games, each job represents a player, who needs to choose a machine for its execution, and intends to complete earliest possible. In an egalitarian objective, the social cost would be the maximal job completion time, i.e. the makespan of the schedule. In an utilitarian objective, the social cost would be th...

We study the effect of perturbations on the Price of Anarchy for the Traffic Assignment Problem. Adopting the smoothed analysis approach, we randomly perturb the latency functions of the given network and estimate the expected Price of Anarchy on the perturbed instances. We provide both theoretical and experimental results that show that the Smoothed Price of Anarchy is of the same order of mag...

This paper initiates a study of connections between local and global properties of graphical games. Specifically, we introduce a concept of local price of anarchy that quantifies how well subsets of agents respond to their environments. We then show several methods of bounding the global price of anarchy of a game in terms of the local price of anarchy. All our bounds are essentially tight.

Network routing games, and more generally congestion games play a central role in algorithmic game theory, comparable to the role of the traveling salesman problem in combinatorial optimization. It is known that the price of anarchy is independent of the network topology for non-atomic congestion games. In other words, it is independent of the structure of the strategy spaces of the players, an...

While selfish routing has been studied extensively, the problem of designing better coordination mechanisms for routing over time in general graphs has remained an open problem. In this paper, we focus on tree networks (single source multiple destinations) with the goal of minimizing (weighted) average sojourn time of jobs, and provide the first coordination mechanisms with provable price of an...