We consider mechanism design and redesign for markets like Internet advertising where many frequent, small transactions are organized by a principal. Mechanisms for these markets rarely have truthtelling equilibria. We identify a family of winner-pays-bid mechanisms for such markets that exhibit three properties. First, equilibria in these mechanisms are simple. Second, the mechanisms’ paramete...

The strategic interactions among the designer of a mechanism and its participants can be modeled as a multi-stage game. The designer moves first by selecting a mechanism. The participants observe the mechanism, and move thereafter. For ease of exposition, we restrict our present attention to a two-stage game, in which the participants play a simultaneous-move (i.e., one-shot) game in the second...

the relationship between objective realities of the time of revelation and impressionability or non- impressionability of revelation from that realities are of the important issues that raised many doubts and debates in recent century. undoubtedly, accepting the impressionability of the holy quran from the realities of that time could be considered as one of the fundamentals of the historicity ...