We consider the problem of an electric-power marketer offering a fixed-price forward contract to provide electricity that it purchases from a potentially volatile and unpredictable fledgling spot energy market. One option for the risk-averse marketer who wants to hedge against the spot-price volatility is to engage in cross hedging to reduce the contract’s profit variance, and to determine the ...

The paper assesses the welfare effects of different ways of allocating input price risk between a regulated utility, consumers and speculators in a futures market. A risk-averse utility setting a fixed retail price requires a price that exceeds expected marginal cost, unless an efficient futures market is available. The firm bears no risk when input price risk is transferred to consumers, but c...

A risk-averse price-setting firm which knows the quantity demanded at the status quo price but has imperfect information otherwise may choose not to change it although an otherwise identical risk-neutral firm would do so, provided the variance of the firm's subjective probability distribution over quantities demanded as a function of price displays a kink at the status quo. This is equivalent t...

Previous research has shown that external reference prices provided by price comparison sites are known to increase both sellers’ price competition and buyers’ price sensitivity. However, there is no clear answer regarding the different impacts of various competition patterns, which are caused by the advent of competitors within price comparison sites, with respect to consumers’ perceptions of ...

The model shows how a regulated monopolist’s price should change as random cost and demand parameters are revealed. The regulator has a Ramsey-type problem. With a linear tariff a trade-off between allocative efficiency and risk sharing typically exists. The attitudes of the consumer and the firm to both income and price risk determine how the price should move. Sufficient conditions are found ...