We study the e¤ects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experiments, we vary groups’preference distributions (between common and con‡icting interests) and the institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two-thirds majority, and unanimity). When deliberation is prohibited, di¤erent institutions generate signi…cantly di¤erent outcomes, tracking the theoretica...

In developing countries markets for agri-food products are changing at a pace that is unparalleled in modern history. Markets are increasingly open and increasingly homogenized toward international tastes and requirements for levels of quality, packaging, safety, and even process attributes such as socially or environmentally friendly methods. New distribution channels, dominated by larger firm...

Tournaments are widely used in the economy to organize production and innovation. We study individual contestant-level data on 2796 contestants in 774 software algorithm design contests with random assignment. Precisely conforming to theory predictions, the performance response to added contestants varies non-monotonically across contestants of different abilities; most respond negatively to co...

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HeLa cell nuclear proteins that bind to single-stranded d(TTAGGG)n, the human telomeric DNA repeat, were identified and purified by a gel retardation assay. Immunological data and peptide sequencing experiments indicated that the purified proteins were identical or closely related to the heterogeneous nuclear ribonucleoproteins (hnRNPs) A1, A2-B1, D, and E and to nucleolin. These proteins bound...

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A project’s cost is private information and its value for the designer may vary. In this allocation problem, the selection of projects both which and how many is endogenously determined by the mechanism. The designer faces ex-post constraints: The participation and budget constrai...

In real life, punishment is often implemented only insofar as punishers are entitled to punish and punishees deserve to be punished. We provide an experimental test for this principle of legitimacy in the framework of a public goods game, by comparing it with a classic (unrestricted) punishment institution. A significant advantage of our institution is that it rules out antisocial punishment, a...

We study the e¤ects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experiments, we vary groups’preference distributions (between common and con‡icting interests) and the institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two-thirds majority, and unanimity). Without deliberation, di¤erent institutions generate signi…cantly di¤erent outcomes, tracking the theoretical comparati...

We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A project’s cost is private information and its value for the designer may vary. In this allocation problem, the selection of projects both which and how many is endogenously determined by the mechanism. The designer faces ex-post constraints: The participation and budget constrai...

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a “complex” partnership, that is, a partnership which produces impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties’ valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be...