We state the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in terms of preference elicitation, resulting in a principled (Bayesian) statistical formulation. This generalises previous work on Bayesian inverse reinforcement learning and allows us to obtain a posterior distribution on the agent’s preferences, policy and optionally, the obtained reward sequence, from observations. We examine the relati...

This paper contributes towards the development of an approach that would generate welfare measures that accommodate non-expected utility risk preferences. Combining the merits of elicitation approaches used in field experiments with contingent valuation, we embed an experimental design that systematically varies probabilities and losses across a survey sample in a willingness to pay elicitation...

Public preferences for environmental policies often vary among individual citizens according to their socio-economic characteristics and attitudes toward environmental programs. Most researchers account for socio-economic characteristics when conducting public preference surveys, but do not account for differences in preferences that transcend socio-economic categories. Identifying the public’s...

We state the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in terms of preference elicitation, resulting in a principled (Bayesian) statistical formulation. This generalises previous work on Bayesian inverse reinforcement learning and allows us to obtain a posterior distribution on the agent’s preferences, policy and optionally, the obtained reward sequence, from observations. We examine the relati...

This paper takes the parameters in central bank loss functions as fundamental preferences to be estimated from the data. It is these preferences (along with target values) that define the policy regime in operation and that potentially change with senior central bank appointments. Optimizing central banks apply policy rules whose feedback coefficients are functions of its preferences. Consequen...

The consequences of many policies are complicated and difficult to foresee. Those who are capable of providing information to policy makers often have a vested interest in the outcomes. This gives them an incentive to distort information to manipulate polic decisions. In this article we argue that reputation or penalties for lying do not alway induce information providers to tell the truth. Rat...

This paper develops a model that incorporates heterogeneity across preference structures where some agents exhibit pro-social behavior – “green” preferences in our examples – and some do not. We compare the relative performance of various policies to increase public goods provision in the presence of this heterogeneity. We find that technology standards are almost always preferable to price ins...

Do preferences toward globalization strategies vary across publicfinance regimes? In this paper, we use data on individual preferences toward immigration and trade policy to examine how pre-tax and posttax cleavages differ across globalization strategies and state fiscal jurisdictions. High exposure to immigrant fiscal pressures reduces support for freer immigration among U.S. natives, especial...

Current approaches to privacy policy comparison use strict evaluation criteria (e.g. user preferences) and are unable to state how close a given policy is to fulfil these criteria. More flexible approaches for policy comparison is a prerequisite for a number of more advanced privacy services, e.g. improved privacy-enhanced search engines and automatic learning of privacy preferences. This paper...