Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry* by Tomaso Duso and Astrid Jung This paper empirically explores the relationship between firms’ market behavior and their lobbying activities in a regulated market. In particular, we investigate whether the amount of contributions offered by cellular service providers to fund the campaigns of polit...

What role does the provision of information by special interest groups play in changing public perceptions about environmental issues, and on the formation of public policy? To date, much of the environmental policy literature has focussed on lobbying efforts by special interest groups in which direct policy contingent contributions are made to the government. However, spending by special inter...

This paper empirically explores the relationship between firms’ market behavior and their lobbying activities in a regulated market. In particular, we investigate whether the amount of contributions offered by cellular service providers to fund the campaigns of political parties affected market conduct in the early US mobile telecommunications industry. We structurally estimate market interacti...

Putting ‘lobbyists’ and ‘lobbying’ on the EU law map – acknowledging that there is little interest in lobbying by legal research explaining why lawyers especially constitutional scholars should be interested presenting a framework to study lobbyists as regulated actors under considering merits of ethnographically-oriented socio-legal ‘new realism’ methods studying lobbying.

Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry* by Tomaso Duso and Astrid Jung This paper empirically explores the relationship between firms’ market behavior and their lobbying activities in a regulated market. In particular, we investigate whether the amount of contributions offered by cellular service providers to fund the campaigns of polit...

This paper develops a new model of a trade agreement that puts at center stage the competing interests between firms within a sector. Larger firms favor trade liberalization whereas smaller firms favor protection. Lobbying by firms for or against the agreement is modelled as an all-pay auction, thus incorporating the feature that binding contracts over contributions for policies cannot be writt...