This paper examines the effects of endogenous coalition formation in a setting where agents lobby a policy-maker. For example, financial firms lobby for weaker regulation to facilitate privately beneficial activities that impose welfare-decreasing externalities (e.g., systemic risk) on the financial system. Policy uniformity (e.g., one-size-fits-all rules) causes agents to free ride on each oth...

We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two “lobbyists” compete for the votes of legislators by o¤ering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists’budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments. JEL classi…cation numbers: P16, C72 Keyw...

This paper, in pursuing the development of Japanese lobbying, explores the Europeanization/harmonization of business-government relationship at the EU level, and assesses how Japanese firms have adapted to the constantly evolving EU lobbying system. Based on thirty interviews with firms, business associations, and EU institutions, we provide an empirical investigation of interaction between tra...

A hierarchical framework is proposed to address the issues of modeling different type of words in keyword spotting (KWS). Keyword models are built at various levels according to the availability of training set resources for each individual word. The proposed approach improves the performance of KWS even when no training speech is available for the keywords. It also suggests an easier way to co...

boolean byte class double else extends final finally float if implements int interface long native new private public return short static super synchronized this throw throws transient try void volatile while ( ) [ ] { } ; , . = Figure 1: Java keywords.

Can multinational firms exert more power than national firms by influencing politics through lobbying? To answer this question, we analyze the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and a firm. We compare the resulting equilibrium regulation levels, outputs and welfare in a game with a multinational firm with those in an oth...

This paper theoretically and empirically studies the impact of corporate governance level on firms’ choice in two political strategies: lobbying and making political contributions. The theoretical model implies that managers with short-run personal interest, prefer making political contributions; while shareholders caring about firms’ longterm success, are willing to do informational lobbying. ...

Using a general equilibrium model with endogenous policy, we explore how heterogeneity affects wasteful lobbying by sectoral interest groups. With the help of a simulation approach, we first investigate the impact of information heterogeneity on how lobbies react to a shift from a soft to a strict government budget constraint. Next, we examine how lobbying is influenced by heterogenous percepti...

The objective of this paper is to quantify Lobbying Effectiveness for trade policy. I introduce this measure into Grossman and Helpman’s (1994, American Economic Review 84: 833–850) model of protection-for-sale (PFS). Two alternate factors are suggested to explain differences in lobbying effectiveness across sectors; first, predisposition of the government to supply protection (owing arguably t...