We present a theory of the dynamics of a firm’s investment in the presence of imperfect capital markets and optimal long-term contracts. The class of imperfections that we consider involves the incentive problems that accompany external financing. The analysis is sufficiently general to encompass a range of such incentive problems. We derive a number of results regarding firms’ investment decis...

College academic affairs management is the core of teaching, the management ability of academic affairs management personnel affects the normal development of college teaching. It meanwhile directly reflects the teaching quality of colleges and universities, thus affecting school development and survival. Therefore, mobilizing the enthusiasm of academic affairs management personnel becomes the ...

OBJECTIVE To evaluate inspiratory volume in patients undergoing cardiac surgery and to determine the effects that incentive spirometry (IS) and the breath stacking (BS) technique have on the recovery of FVC in such patients. METHODS A prospective, controlled, randomized clinical trial involving 35 patients undergoing cardiac surgery at the Hospital de Força Aérea do Galeão (HFAG, Galeão Air F...

This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg problems. These are problems where the decisions or actions in successive layers of the hierarchy are taken in a sequential way while decisions or actions within each layer are taken in a simultaneous manner. There are m...

This paper deals with traffic rate control problems of networks. The incentive Stackelberg strategy concept was introduced to the networking model that comprises subsidiary systems of users and network. A linear strategy and a nonlinear strategy were proposed to the elastic traffic problem, with the illustrations via examples. The presented method was extended to non-elastic traffic problem.

Much work has been done to address the need for incentive models in real deployed peer-to-peer networks. In this paper, we discuss problems found with the incentive model in a large, deployed peer-to-peer network, Maze. We evaluate several alternatives, and propose an incentive system that generates preferences for wellbehaved nodes while correctly punishing colluders. We discuss our proposal a...

The paper investigates the interaction between dynamic forms of incentive mechanisms (patent systems) and dynamic forms of problems (adaptations of pests and pathogens). Since biological problems recur, the design of the incentive mechanism must take into consideration: a) the need for investments into R&D that take into account the impermanence of the solution concepts; and b) the impact of th...

A large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a Bayesian equilibrium. This paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing Bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies. We identify contexts where it is possible to change the transfer payments of a...

A common methodology in experimental research is the use of random incentive mechanisms. This note investigates possible distortion induced by such mechanisms in the context of choice under risk. In the baseline (one task) treatment of our experiment we observe risk behavior in a given choice problem. We show that by integrating a second, asymmetrically dominated choice problem in a random ince...

This paper discusses the incentive conflicts that arise in banking supervision in the EU in a principal-agent framework, where the regulator is the agent and the taxpayers is the principal. The regulatory agent in addition to maintaining financial stability (the objective of the principal) may pursue private interests. Incomplete information, insufficient accountability of the agent and lack of...