This paper examines an extended double auction model where market clearing is restricted by temporal constraints. It is found that the allocation problem in this model can be effectively transformed into a weighted bipartite matching in graph theory. By using the augmentation technique, we propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in this model and demonstrate the advantages of the paymen...

Mechanism design studies incentives by making intense use of incentive compatibility and direct mechanisms, concepts familiar from Economics 602. One has a social choice function or correspondence in mind, which encompasses the desirable behavior of the economy (for each economy we consider, it yields the desirable allocations; we evaluate outcomes only, not the process of reaching them). One t...

The distinction between voluntarism and intellectualism has recently been criticized for inaccurately characterising early modern theories of divine freedom. In response, defenders the have argued that these labels are needed in order to account famous correspondence Leibniz (intellectualist) Clarke (voluntarist). this paper, I argue voluntarism/intellectualism is unable opposition Clarke. firs...