We consider how many bits need to be exchanged to implement a given decision rule when the mechanism must be ex post or Bayesian incentive compatible. For ex post incentive compatibility, the communication protocol must reveal enough information to calculate monetary transfers to the agents to motivate them to be truthful (agents’ payoffs are assumed to be quasilinear in such transfers). For Ba...

We present Loss-Tolerant Selfishness Monitor (LTSM), a generic service for detecting selfish behavior in various P2P applications, such as MANET routing and multicast. Unlike most previous selfishness-resistant protocols, LTSM can be used in networks subject to message loss, where selfish behavior detection is particularly challenging. One of our main contributions is mathematically analyzing t...

We present Loss-Tolerant Selfishness Monitor (LTSM), a generic service for detecting selfish behavior in various P2P applications, such as MANET routing and multicast. Unlike most previous selfishness-resistant protocols, LTSM can be used in networks subject to message loss, where selfish behavior detection is particularly challenging. One of our main contributions is mathematically analyzing t...

In this article, I defend the thesis that selfishness and altruism can be intrapersonal. In doing so, I argue that the notions of intrapersonal altruism and selfishness usefully pick out behavioural patterns and have predictive value. I also argue that my thesis helps enrich our understanding of the prudential, and can subsume some interesting work in economic and psychological theory. 'Why bot...

In this paper, we review the approaches that uses the Generic methods to enforce cooperation in ad hoc routing. A very common assumption in the analysis and development of networking algorithms is the full co-operation of the participating nodes. However, the reality may differ considerably. The existence of multiple domains belonging to different authorities or even the selfishness of the node...

Models of inequity aversion and fairness have dominated the behavioral economics landscape in the last decade. This study gathers data from 240 subjects exposed to variants of two of the major experimental games—dictator and trust—that are employed to provide important empirical content to these models. With a set of simple laboratory treatments that focus on a manipulation of an important feat...