Just how much can, and should we change human nature by genetic engineering? Our response to that hinges on the answers to three further questions: (1) What can we do now? Or more precisely, what are we doing now in the area of human genetic engineering? (2) What will we be able to do? In other words, what technical advances are we likely to achieve over the next five to ten years? (3) What sho...

Abstract—Non-malleability is an important property in commitment schemes. It can resist to the person-in-the-middle (PIM) attacks within the interaction. In this paper, we focus on the non-malleability in ID-based trapdoor commitments. We first give two constructions of (full) ID-based trapdoor commitment schemes based on RSA and Factoring assumptions respectively and then extend them to non-m...

Delegation of signing rights is a central problem in security. Whereas delegating by givingpower of attorney is well studied and digitally realized via delegatable anonymous credentials,directly delegating signing possibilities without the need for an external logic, can be done viamalleable signature schemes. However, the existing schemes do not allow for privacy preserving,fin...

This paper presents a user-level runtime system which provides memory malleability to programs running on non-dedicated computational environments. Memory malleability is analogous to processor malleability in the memory space, i.e. it lets a program shrink and expand its resident set size in response to runtime events, without affecting the correct execution of the program. Malleability become...

How many rounds and which computational assumptions are needed for concurrent nonmalleable commitments? The above question has puzzled researchers for several years. Recently, Pass in [TCC 2013] proved a lower bound of 3 rounds when security is proven through black-box reductions to falsifiable assumptions. On the other side, positive results of Goyal [STOC 2011], Lin and Pass [STOC 2011] and G...