Free AccessImportant Keywordshttps://doi.org/10.14220/9783737013444.259SectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail About Previous chapter Next FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Download book coverOsnabrücker Studien zur Jüdischen und Christlichen Bibel.Volume 8 1st editionISBN: 978-3-8471-1344-7 eISBN: 978-3-7370-1344-4Hi...

We provide the first comprehensive study of lobbying across venues by studying interest group registrations in both the legislative and administrative branches. We present four major findings based on Federal and state data. First, groups engage in substantial administrative lobbying relative to legislative lobbying. Second, the vast majority of groups lobby the legislature, but a large proport...

This paper investigates if multinationals influence the political process through lobbying more effectively than national firms. First, I introduce a model which contrasts a multinational’s incentives for lobbying with those of a national firm. Then the effect of lobbying on the political decision is analyzed. I conclude that multinationals have smaller incentives to lobby because they have sma...

This paper surveys recent approaches towards lobbying if interest groups influence the decision of an incumbent government. It describes the two main channels of influence which mainly exist in parallel, namely contribution payments and the transmission of information through lobbying. Recent extensions to the two basic lobbying models are discussed in great detail. Thereafter follows a short o...

The number o f Japanese firms in Brussels has increased since the creation o f the European Single Market. At the same time, large European firms have become independent political actors and harmonized their lobbying pattern, creating a distinctive business-govemment relationship in the EU. Yet, it still remains to be examined whether Japanese firms are able to utilize their political options a...

This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature’s standard assumption that “money buys policies”. Our model – in which influence-seeking requires both money to “buy access” and managerial time to “utilize access” — offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the “money-buys-policies” assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying ...

This paper aims to fill in the gap in research on the effect of pharmaceutical lobbying on drug reimbursement policy, particularly in Poland, a post-communist country. To this end, we conducted in-depth, semi-structured, anonymous, elite interviews in Poland, supplemented by a review of legislation, policy documents, official reports and press articles, as well as observations. Overall, 109 rep...

A two-count ry, twōrm model has been developed to study equilibrium lobbying posit ions in intra-industry trade under cost uncertainty. A ̄rm chooses either a protect ionist posit ion or a free-t rader posit ion. The model predicts that taking the free-t rader (protect ionist) lobbying posit ion is an e± cient (ine± cient) ̄rm's dominant strategy. In addit ion, for any lobbying posit ion taken ...

This study examines the costs and benefits of uniform accounting regulation in the presence of heterogeneous firms that can lobby the regulator. A commitment to uniform regulation reduces economic distortions caused by lobbying by creating a free-rider problem between lobbying firms at the cost of forcing the same treatment on heterogeneous firms. Resolving this tradeoff, an institutional commi...