Eliciting truthful responses from self interested agents is an important problem in game theory and microeconomics and it is studied under mechanism design or implementation theory Truthful mechanisms have received considerable interest within computer science recently for designing protocols for Internet based applications which typically involve cooperation of multiple self interested agents ...

A weighted-voting mechanism is presented in which agents are able to jointly decide on plan repair proposals in the airport traffic control domain. The mechanism uses Clarke Tax for incentive compatible bidding. It provides a slider value by which an airport can control the balance between optimality and fairness of plan repair solutions. Special care is taken to ensure that agents have no ince...

The idea behind the Clarke Tax Algorithm is that a tax will be assessed to each individual. The amount of this tax depends on how the individual’s utilities affect the rest of the group. Since people do not want to pay taxes, a big assessment will decrease an individual’s overall utility. To get a better understanding of this statement, it is helpful to restrict the problem a bit. Formally, the...