The essence of the routing problem in real networks is that the traffic demand from a source to destination must be satisfied by choosing a single path between source and destination. The splittable version of this problem is when demand can be satisfied by many paths, namely a flow from source to destination. The unsplittable, or discrete version of the problem is more realistic yet is more co...

We study the quality of outcomes in games when the population of players is dynamically changing, and where participants have to adapt to the dynamic environment. Price of Anarchy has originally been introduced to study the Nash equilibria of one-shot games. The Price of Total Anarchy extends this notion to learning outcomes in a repeated setting, assuming all players use a form of no-regret le...

Recent interest in Nash equilibria led to a study of the price of anarchy (POA) and the strong price of anarchy (SPOA) for scheduling problems. The two measures express the worst case ratio between the cost of an equilibrium (a pure Nash equilibrium, and a strong equilibrium, respectively) to the cost of a social optimum. The atomic players are the jobs, and the delay of a job is the completion...

Carlos Eduardo Maldonado has a Ph.D. in Philosophy from KULEuven (Belgium). He has been visiting professor and visiting research scholar at the University of Pittsburgh, the Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C.), and the University of Cambridge. He holds an honorary doctorate from the University of Timisoara (Romania). He is currently Research Professor at the School of Political Sc...

The price of anarchy is by now a standard measure for quantifying the inefficiency introduced in games due to selfish behavior, and is defined as the ratio between the optimal outcome and the worst Nash equilibrium. However, the price of anarchy is not even defined in games that admit no Nash equilibrium. We propose the dynamic inefficiency measure, which quantifies the average inefficiency int...

We consider a class of networks where n agents need to send their traffic from a given source to a given destination over m identical, non-intersecting, and parallel links. For such networks, our interest is in computing the worst case loss in social welfare when a distributed routing scheme is used instead of a centralized one. For this, we use a noncooperative game model with price of anarchy...

one of the issues that has always been of interest to and emphasized by muslim scholars in various sources of jurisprudence, principles, and other islamic texts is the issue of “preserving the socio-political system.” this endeavor results from the importance of community, integration of people’s social life, and avoidance of anarchy and disturbances in social affairs in islam. this issue is so...

We study the problem of optimizing traffic in decentralized transportation networks, where the cost of a link depends on its congestion. If users of a transportation network are permitted to choose their own routes, they generally try to minimize their personal travel time. In the absence of centralized coordination, such a behavior can be inefficient for society and even for each individual us...