We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function C is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be learned from samples drawn from a distribution, represented as tuples (S,C(S)), for different subsets S of players. We formalize this approach, which we call STATISTICAL COST SHARING, and consider the computation of the core and the Shapley val...

In this paper, the generalized forms of the fuzzy core and the Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids are given. An equivalent form of the fuzzy core is researched. In order to better understand the fuzzy core and the Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids, we pay more attention to study three kinds of dynamic fuzzy games on matroids, which are named as fuzzy games w...

One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it possible to study this trade-off in a consistent way by providing three types of results on egalitari...

In this paper, we anatomize incentive structures in peer assisted services with multiple content providers and focus on stability issues from two different angles: stability at equilibrium of Shapley value and convergence to the equilibrium. We first define a coalition game in a peer assisted service with multiple content providers by classifying the types of coalition structures as separated, ...

We show that computing the Shapley value of minimum cost spanning tree games is #P-hard even if the cost functions are restricted to be {0, 1}-valued. The proof is by a reduction from counting the number of minimum 2-terminal vertex cuts of an undirected graph, which is #P-complete. We also investigate minimum cost spanning tree games whose Shapley values can be computed in polynomial time. We ...

This paper studies the process of information diffusion over a network, where new nodes as time passes become “informed” (or equivalently, influenced or infected), and a related problem of influence maximization that concerns finding the set of initial nodes that will lead to the most widespread effect of diffusion in the network [4, 6]. Influence maximization is an NP-hard problem [4], and the...

an enterprise resource planning (erp) software is needed for industries and companies that want to develop in future. many of the manufactures and companies have a problem with erp software selection. an inappropriate selection process can affect both the implementation and the performance of the company significantly. although several models are proposed to solve this problem many of them did n...

We study the Shapley value in weighted voting games. The Shapley value has been used as an index for measuring the power of individual agents in decision-making bodies or political organizations, in which decisions are made by a voting process. Previous studies assume that agent weights (corresponding to the size of a caucus or a political party) are fixed; we analyze new domains in which the w...

In this paper we provide new axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU-games using axioms that are based on relational aspects in the interactions among players. Some of these relational aspects, in particular the economic or social interest of each player in cooperating with each other, can be found embedded in the characteristic function. We define a particular relation among the players th...