The new …eld of judgment aggregation aims to …nd group judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results have established limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions, hence notably on the possibility to use quota rules (rules with acceptance thresholds for the propositions). I show that, fortunately, the impossibilities fail to apply t...

This paper establishes a relationship between the observability of common shocks and optimal organizational design under a multiagent moral hazard environment. The choices of organization and investment on information about common shocks are determined jointly, in a Walrasian equilibrium model where the commodities traded are memberships in organizations. Numerical results reveal that both coop...

We consider the problem of randomly assigning n indivisible objects to n agents. Recent research introduced a promising mechanism, the probabilistic serial that has superior e¢ ciency properties than the most common real-life mechanism random priority. On the other hand, mechanisms based on Gale’s celebrated top trading cycles method have long dominated the indivisible goods literature (with th...

We consider the Shapley-Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget balanced, and “collusion-proof.” In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the (unique) core assignment of the Shapley-Scar...

Abstract. The Tolman–Oppenheimer–Volkov [TOV] equation constrains the internal structure of general relativistic static perfect fluid spheres. We develop several “solution generating” theorems for the TOV, whereby any given solution can be “deformed” to a new solution. Because the theorems we develop work directly in terms of the physical observables — pressure profile and density profile — it ...

This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For any number of alternatives and at least four voters, we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance-solvable (DS) and not to be DS. These conditions can be stated in terms of only one aspect of the game, the largest proportion of voters who agree on ...

The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency b...

A judgement aggregation rule takes the views of a collection of voters over a set of interconected issues, and yields a logically consistent collective view. The median rule is a judgement aggregation rule that selects the logically consistent view which minimizes the average distance to the views of the voters (where the “distance” between two views is the number of issues on which they disagr...

When resources are divided among agents, the characteristics of the agents are taken into consideration. A simple example is the bankruptcy problem, where the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm is divided among the creditors based on their claims. We characterize division rules under which no group of agents can increase the total amount they receive by transferring their characteristics with...

It is well known that ex post e¢ cient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational. However, the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided. This paper instead considers majority voting with uniform cost sharing as the relevant status quo. E¢ cient mechani...