We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or criticalprice payment rules, are used to resolve multiparameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study the price of anarchy for social welfare in such auctions. We show, for a variety of equilibrium concepts, including Bayes–Nash equilibria, low-regret bidding sequences, and asynchronous bestresponse dynamics, that...

Two important metrics for measuring the quality of routing paths are the maximum edge con-gestion C and maximum path length D. Here, we study bicriteria in routing games where eachplayer i selfishly selects a path that simultaneously minimizes its maximum edge congestion Ciand path length Di. We study the stability and price of anarchy of two bicriteria games:• Max games, where ...

We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or critical-price payment rules, are used to resolve multi-parameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study the price of anarchy for social welfare in such auctions. We show for a variety of equilibrium concepts, including Bayes-Nash equilibrium, low-regret bidding sequences, and asynchronous best-response dynamics, t...

We consider the well-studied game-theoretic version of machine scheduling in which jobs correspond to self-interested users and machines correspond to resources. Here each user chooses a machine trying to minimize her own cost, and such selfish behavior typically results in some equilibrium which is not globally optimal : An equilibrium is an allocation where no user can reduce her own cost by ...

One of the main results shown through Roughgarden’s notions of smooth games and robust price of anarchy is that, for any sum-bounded utilitarian social function, the worst-case price of anarchy of coarse correlated equilibria coincides with that of pure Nash equilibria in the class of weighted congestion games with non-negative and non-decreasing latency functions and that such a value can alwa...

Internet users, auction bidders, and stock buyers are examples of agents who are selfishly trying to maximize their own benefit without necessarily caring the global objective of the underlying game such as the overall load on the network or the overall satisfaction of agents. How does these two points of view (agents vs. global) correlate? How much does the society suffer by the lack of coordi...

Generalized Second Price Auction, also known as Ad Word auction, and its variants have been the main mechanism used by search companies to auction positions for sponsored search links. In this paper we study the social welfare of the Nash equilibria of this game under the Bayes-Nash solution concept (i.e., in a partial information setting). In this model, the value of each player for one click ...

Recent studies revealed that some social and technological network formations can be represented by the network formation games played by selfish multiple agents. In general, the topologies formed by selfish multiple agents are worse than or equal to those formed by the centralized designer in the sense of social total welfare. Several works such as the price of anarchy are known as a measure f...

We model the economics of producing content in online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter. We propose a game-theoretic model within which we quantify inefficiencies from contributions by strategic users in online environments. Attention and information are assumed to be the main motivation for user contributions. We treat attention as a mechanism for sharing the profit from consuming i...