Consider a seller who faces two customer segments with differing valuations of quality of a durable product. Demand is stationary and knos-n. the technology exists to release two products simultaneously, and the seller car1 commit in advance to subsequent prices and qualities. Should he introduce two differentiated products at once or one at a time? Undcr the simultaneous strategy, the lowcr qu...

Many advertisers (bidders) use Internet systems to buy advertisements on publishers’ webpages or on traditional media such as radio, TV and newsprint. They seek a simple, online mechanism to reserve ad slots in advance. On the other hand, media publishers (sellers) represent a vast and varying inventory, and they too seek automatic, online mechanisms for pricing and allocating such reservations...

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>The purpose of this paper is to study the impact bounded consumer rationality on order quantity and profitability seller in advance period spot context combination new retail pre-sale. In paper, we develop a model pre-sale, with without reference price dependence. Besides, considers cancellation delayed purchase behavior consumers. We then discuss optimal prof...

Web business models typically rely on environments where entities, not known in advance, try to negotiate and agree on the purchase of products. Such environments are termed Electronic Markets (EMs). In EMs there are two main groups of entities: the buyers and the sellers. Intelligent agents can play the role of buyers and sellers as delegates of them. Agents, acting autonomously, can guarantee...

Abstract Reverse pricing is a market mechanism under which a consumer’s bid for a product leads to a sale if the bid exceeds a hidden acceptance threshold the seller has set in advance. The seller faces two key decisions in designing such a mechanism: First, he must decide where in the process to collect the revenue—that is, whether to commit to a minimum markup above cost (and thus define the ...

We consider a stylized dynamic pricing model in which a monopolist prices a product to a sequence of customers, who independently make purchasing decisions based on the price offered according to a logit choice model. The parameters of the logit model are unknown to the seller, whose objective is to determine a pricing policy that minimizes the regret, which is the expected difference between t...

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after observing their bids. Bidders are uncertain about the seller’s cost. We experimentally investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform price auction produces s...