This article reviews eight proposed strategies for solving the Symbol Grounding Problem (SGP), which was given its classic formulation in Harnad (1990). After a concise introduction, we provide an analysis of the requirement that must be satisfied by any hypothesis seeking to solve the SGP, the zero semantical commitment condition. We then use it to assess the eight strategies, which are organi...

On Gregg Rosenberg’s (2004) view, synesthesia illustrates how phenomenal properties can vary independently of representational properties. I explain how the representationalist can answer his arguments. The belief that synesthesia poses a serious problem for representationalism derives, I argue, from misconceptions about representationalism. Rosenberg’s discussion of synesthesia and representat...

The received view holds that there is a significant divide between full-blown representational states and so called ‘detectors’, which are mechanisms set off by specific stimuli trigger particular effect. main goal of this paper to defend the idea many detectors genuine representations, I call ‘Strong Liberal Representationalism’. More precisely, argue ascribing semantic properties them contrib...

When Dewey declared in  that pragmatism would ‘give the coup de grace to representationalism ’, he had (to say the least) underestimated the tenacity of the intended victim. Even as he wrote, Russell was at work on the waggons which were to carry so much of philosophy into new lands—regions where Frege’s referentialism was part of the bedrock (or so it seemed). A century later, despite rene...

It is widely acknowledged that a complete theory of consciousness should explain general consciousness (what makes a state conscious at all) and specific consciousness (what gives a conscious state its particular phenomenal quality). We defend first-order representationalism, which argues that consciousness consists of sensory representations directly available to the subject for action selecti...

Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should ke...