This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share cost running public election and, second, coordinate policy platform. The characterizes set equilibria with two competing and one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, distance between both platforms is always positive but li...

We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. consider dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either risky reform or safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed, the unique equilibrium outcome generically inefficient. allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an that supports for any voting rule without veto players. With players, however...

The purpose of this paper is to provide a normative analysis of some migration issues. Our main objective is to develop a social-choice theoretical framework to evaluate alternative immigration policies of a country. For illustrative purposes, we present some simple results that are characterizations of some policy evaluation functions that have some specific features. JEL Classification Number...

∗Institute of Mathematics; and Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory; The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Givat Ram; Jerusalem 91904; Israel. E-mail: [email protected] This research was in part supported by The Israel Science Foundation grant 382/98. J.E.L. Classification numbers. D70, D71, D63, C71

For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of Arrow’s IIA. JEL Codes: D70, D71

This paper investigates ethical aggregation of infinite utility streams by representable social welfare relations. We prove that the Hammond Equity postulate and other variations of it like the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle are incompatible with positive responsiveness to welfare improvements by every generation. The case of Hammond Equity for the Future is investigated too. JEL classificatio...

I introduce a model of corporate voting. I characterize the shareholder majority rule as the unique corporate voting rule that satisfies four axioms: anonymity, neutrality, share monotonicity, and merger, a property that requires consistency in election outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers. JEL classification: D71, D72, K22

Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers. JEL Classification number: D81, D71