We design an efficient and transaction cost reducing Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction as part of a web service for the work allocation problem in temporary employment agencies. In this auction bids are work contracts with multidimensional salaries. To compute the allocation we assume that every temporary employment worker conveys a utility function specifying the utility gained from working a give...

Cecil Clarke was born in Bristol in 1885, the son 01 Leslie M. Clarke. After an education at the Warn1111 Grammar School he joined the Bristol Medical Schoolclinical appointments were done at the General H?bj There he gained the Henry Marshall Prize, the Clarke / lllkg( Scholarship, and the Martyn Memorial Scholarship 111 caIne and the Sanders Scholarship in 1909. In 1908 he > rSjty qualified, ...

We evaluate the applicability of generic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as an antimonopoly measure against a profit-maximizing producer with market power operating portfolio generating units at centralized two-settlement energy market. The may indicate in its bid not only altered cost function but also distorted values technical parameters units, which enter system-wide constraints dispa...

We present a multiagent decision mechanism for the airport traffic control domain. It enables airlines to jointly decide on proposals for plan conflict solutions. The mechanism uses weighted voting for maximizing global utility and Clarke Tax to discourage manipulation. We introduce accounts to ensure that all agents are treated fairly, to some extent. The mechanism allows an airport to determi...

its neighbours, above and below. A good rule is that the space between any two pavilions should be about equal to 1^ times the height of such pavilions?thus if a pavilion be 75 feet high, the distance between it and its neighbour should be not less than 90 to 100 feet. The pavilions may be built radiating like the spokes of a wheel (like several of the Central Jails in India) or in form of a ho...

We study auctions with additive valuations where agents have a limit on the number of goods they may receive. We refer to such valuations as capacitated and seek mechanisms that maximize social welfare and are simultaneously incentive compatible, envy-free, individually rational, and have no positive transfers. If capacities are infinite, then sequentially repeating the 2nd price Vickrey auctio...