I show how uncertainty about fundamentals can cause delay in bargaining when agents have reputational concerns. Agents’ publicly observable costs of delay change stochastically at some revelation time. In addition to rational agents, there are behavioral types committed to many different fixed demands. I show that even when the probability of behavioral types is arbitrarily small, agreement may...

We study information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We focus on the one-sided case and perform a dynamic analysis of a constant entry flow model. The same question has been studied in an identical framework in Serrano and Yosha (1993) but they limit their analysis to the stationary steady states. We show that there is a dramatical loss when restricting the analysis of a constant ...

The revelation principle is reconsidered in the light of recent work questioning its general applicability, as well as other work on the Bayesian foundations of game theory. Implementation in rationalizable strategies is considered. A generalized version of the revelation principle is proposed recognizing that, unless agents all have dominant strategies, the outcome of any allocation mechanism ...

Delegation versus Authority by Daniel Krähmer The paper studies the role of delegation and authority within a principal-agent relation in which a non-contractible action has to be taken. The agent has private information relevant for the principal, but has policy preferences different from the principal. Consequently, an information revelation problem arises. We contribute to the literature by ...

Lubin Chang, Member, IEEE Naval University of Engineering, Wuhan, China (e-mail:[email protected]) Abstract—This note reveals an explicit relationship between two representative finite impulse response (FIR) filters, i.e. the newly derived and popularized Kalman-Like unbiased FIR filter (UFIR) and the receding horizon Kalman FIR filter (RHKF). It is pointed out that the only difference of the ...

As is well-known from the literature on oligopolistic competition with incomplete information, firms have incentives to share private value demand information. However, by assuming verifiability of demand data, these models ignore the possibility of strategic misinformation. We show that if firms can send misleading demand information, they will always do so. Furthermore, we derive a costly sig...

The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in many economics fields. In this paper, we construct a simple labor model to show that a social choice function which can be implemented costly in Bayesian Nash equilibrium may not be truthfully implementable. The key point is the strategy cost condition given in Section 4: In the direct mechanism, each agent only reports a type and will not pa...