The standard monopoly pricing problem is re-considered when the buyer’s type (e.g. age, income, experience) can be credibly disclosed at some cost. In the optimal sales mechanism with costly disclosure, the seller posts a “sticker price” available to any buyer, as well as a schedule of discounts available to those who disclose certain types. Unambiguous welfare implications are available in the...

This study investigates when forced sales turn into fire sales by using a natural experiment which allows us to separate supply and demand effects: Forced sales result from sudden death of house owners and are thus unrelated to current market conditions. We find that forced sales result in fire sale discounts. Discounts increase when the sale is urgent, market conditions are poor, the seller is...

We construct a model of a local ketchup market of a city in Texas that accounts for household, manufacturer, and retailer decisions. That is, the model develops both the demand and the supply side of the market. The demand side is modeled through a latent utility framework allowing for the ‘no-purchase’ option. Accounting for both sides of the market allows one to check for any endogeneity prob...

We integrate production and distribution decisions in a recovery planning model for a disrupted production system to minimize the negative impacts of disruption on its profit and customers' satisfaction. The problem is originally motivated by the real-life case of an explosion disaster occurred in September 2015 in a leading producer of household consumer goods in Iran. Multiple recovery polici...

We examine how the feasibility of both nonlinear pricing and exclusive dealing arrangements affect incentives for market foreclosure when two manufacturers contract with a retail monopolist. Surprisingly, we find that although market foreclosure equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated (from each manufacturer’s perspective) by all nonforeclosure equilibria. If one believes that Paretodominat...

Previous papers find no relationship between interest rates and the discounts of US closed-end funds before 1985. This is taken as evidence against management fees being a cause of discounts because a negative relationship is expected: if interest rates rise, you would expect to see discounts fall as the present value of future fees is reduced. But from 1985 forward, there has been a strong pos...

This paper extends the standard model of bundling to allow products to be substitutes and for products to be supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, …rms have an incentive to introduce bundling discounts when demand for the bundle is elastic relative to demand for stand-alone products. Separate …rms often have a unilateral incentive to o¤er inter-…rm bundle discounts, alth...